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How to Understand Legislatures: A 
Comment on Boudreau, Lupia, 
McCubbins, and Rodriguez 
LARRY ALEXANDER* 
Much has been written about legal interpretation, and I have serious 
disagreements with most of it.  So it is quite refreshing to read an article 
on the topic that, from my perspective, gets the topic right from start to 
finish.  As an added bonus, two of the authors are my former colleagues.  
My enthusiasm for the approach taken by Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, 
and Rodriguez (hereinafter BLMR) has not proven fatal to my task of 
commenting on the article.1  I am not reduced to saying “Right on” and 
then signing off.  There are issues to be flagged.  Nonetheless, so much 
of what BLMR have to say is just plain good sense on a topic that is 
sorely in need of it that my remarks will be mainly promptings to take 
their basic approach further than they have done. 
BLMR take as their axioms that (1) statutes are communications from 
the legislature, and (2) statutes communicate commands that are 
constitutionally privileged—commands that, given our constitutional 
structure, others are obligated to obey.  Both of those axioms are 
correct.2 
BLMR also argue that, like other communications from humans to each 
other, statutes “compress” the meaning of their commands into signals—
 * Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 1. Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and 
Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 958. 




the statutory text—and the purpose of interpretation is to decode those 
signals, or, as they put it, “expand” the signals into their intended meaning.3  
Again, if per axiom (1), statutes are communications, and per axiom 
(2), interpreters are obligated to obey the commands communicated, then 
BLMR’s model of compression and expansion of intended meaning 
appears to follow.  The task of the interpreter, be she a court or one 
directly regulated by the statute, is to decode the statutory text—the 
signal—to ascertain its intended meaning. 
We humans do this all the time.  Despite the many ways in which we 
can misunderstand one another, we rather frequently successfully decode 
signals into their intended meanings.  We do so by looking at, among 
other things, the standard and nonstandard conventional meanings of 
marks or sounds; what we know about the speaker or author’s linguistic 
skill—is she a native English speaker, and is she a competent one or 
instead one prone to malapropisms, slips of the tongue, et cetera; what 
we know about the speaker’s purposes in uttering the communication; 
and so on.  Though we are fallible, were we not quite good at such 
decodings, human life would look quite different and surely much worse 
than it does. 
The main focus of BLMR’s article is on whether and which parts of a 
statute’s legislative history will be reliable evidence for decoding its 
meaning—for expanding the signal that is the statutory text in a way that 
matches the meaning that was compressed into it—a fancy way of 
describing discovering the statute’s intended meaning.  BLMR describe 
the process by which bills work their way through the House of 
Representatives and ultimately get passed, as well as the various ways 
that key operatives within the process deal with statements by various 
legislators regarding the statute’s intended meaning.4  Some of these 
statements are reliable evidence of intended meaning, whereas others are 
not.  One purpose of BLMR’s article is to point interpreters toward those 
aspects of legislative history that are reliable guides to legislative intent 
and away from those that are unreliable. 
After they discuss reliable and unreliable evidence of statutory 
meaning, BLMR conclude with a critique of competing theories of 
statutory interpretation—textualist, purposivist, Dworkinian, constructivist, 
dynamic, and others. 5  BLMR find them all wanting, given that unlike 
BLMR’s intentionalism, these theories do not seek a statutory meaning 
that matches the intended meaning that was compressed into the signal 
and therefore fail to respect the legislative supremacy established by the 
 3. Id. at 958–59, 971–72. 
 4. Id. at 969–70, 979–81. 
 5. Id. at 981–91. 
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Constitution.  I agree completely with BLMR’s criticisms of these theories.  
Indeed, I have made the same criticisms elsewhere.6 
There are some issues regarding statutory interpretation that intentionalists 
like BLMR and me need to grapple with, but which BLMR’s piece does 
not discuss.  Intentionalism in statutory interpretation is typically attacked 
on two bases: evidentiary—that divining the intended meaning of a 
multimember and perhaps bicameral legislature is beyond the competence 
of interpreters; and conceptual—that legislative intended meaning is 
nonexistent.  BLMR’s article is directed at the evidentiary critique.  Their 
contention is that we can decode legislation into its intended meaning, 
and that consulting legislative history, if done with their sophisticated 
understanding of the process and the politics, can be helpful in decoding 
correctly.  They say almost nothing about the conceptual attack, however. 
So what is the conceptual problem with their—and my—intentionalist 
theory of statutory interpretation?  Why do opponents deny the existence 
of any intended meaning that statutes are capable of encoding? 
Quite simply, the problem is that of the multiplicity of legislators.  Critics 
of intentionalism argue that however plausible intentionalism would be 
were the legislature a single individual, Lex, under our Constitution, the 
legislature is 435 representatives, 100 senators, and, on some theories, the 
President.  Moreover, these 536 individuals are divided among three 
institutions—the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Presidency.  
The single ruler, Lex, just like your spouse when listing your assigned 
chores, will have intended meanings compressed into his or her code, 
meanings that you are obligated to replicate in your expansion of the 
code.  However, it is not the case that the Constitution’s Lex—its three 
branches comprised of 536 individual minds—has an intended meaning 
compressed into its code.  Statutory interpretation, say the critics, must 
thus be something other than recovering the intended meaning of our 
Lex, for there is no such thing. 
That is the attack.  And although I believe it is incorrect, I believe that 
it must be confronted. 
 6. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities 
and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357, 368–69, 393, 395 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English 
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 967 (2004); Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation, 12 
LAW & PHIL. 319, 320 (1993). 




BLMR’s piece can be read as attempt to respond to this attack.  After 
all, they are dealing with statements regarding statutory meaning that are 
made by various legislators at various points in the legislative process, 
and they are pointing out which statements by whom are reliable. 
But reliable in what sense?  A legislator’s statement about statutory 
meaning can be reliable evidence of that meaning, or it can be reliable 
because it is constitutive of that meaning.  As I read BLMR, they are 
discussing reliability in the first, evidentiary sense.  But the conceptual 
critique of intentionalism goes to how the intended meaning of individual 
legislators can or cannot constitute legislative intent. 
In one place BLMR state that “judges should not suppose that legislators 
necessarily have an intent in the ordinary sense in which we view 
individuals as having intentions . . . .”7  That statement suggested to me that 
perhaps BLMR were going to address the conceptual point by arguing 
for some kind of Searlian “we intend” that was different from the mere 
aggregation of individual intended meanings.8  But immediately after 
that statement the article reverts to discussing the ordinary way we 
impute intentions to individual humans.  They then state: 
   In the context of statutes, the intentional stance requires that judges treat 
legislators as rational actors with beliefs, desires, and intentions and then 
interpret their statements in this light.  In our reading, the intentional stance 
recognizes that legislators have the ability to delegate to select colleagues, as 
well as the ability to communicate a statute’s meaning on behalf of the group 
with constitutionally validated authority.9 
Note the reference to communicating about a statute’s meaning on behalf 
of other legislators.  Such a communication could not be constitutive of the 
statute’s meaning, nor could the spokesperson’s intended meaning be so, 
for then the communication would not be about that meaning. 
Perhaps BLMR mean to suggest that such key players have the delegated 
authority to have their intended meanings constitute the legislature’s 
intended meaning.  In such a case, we would drop the question of credibility 
because credibility would be an issue only if the spokesperson were 
discussing a meaning not constituted by his statements.  He could, I 
suppose, be prevaricating about his own intended meaning, but what 
would be the point of such a self-defeating maneuver? 
If we want to figure out how the intended meanings of various 
legislators constitute the intended meaning that statutory interpretation 
should strive to recover, then we must deal head on with the conceptual 
problem that the multiplicity of legislators raises.  Suppose, then, that we 
 7. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 972. 
 8. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 26 (1995). 
 9. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 972–73. 
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have a city council comprised of three members—A, B, and C.  Suppose 
A proposes a “No dogs in restaurants” ordinance.  A and B vote for it, 
and C votes against it.  A assumed that the ordinance did not apply to 
guide dogs for the blind.  He would not have proposed or voted for it had 
it excluded guide dogs from restaurants.  His intended meaning was 
“dogs other than guide dogs are prohibited.” 
B, on the other hand, assumed the proposed ordinance did include 
guide dogs, and he voted for it on that assumption.  His intended meaning 
was “all dogs are prohibited.”  Moreover, had the ordinance not included 
guide dogs, B would have voted against it.  He does not believe the blind 
should be favored over those who for other reasons will forgo eating in 
restaurants rather than abandon their canine companions. 
C, the libertarian on the council, believes restaurants should be free to 
set their own rules about animals and not be subject to regulation.  C 
would have voted against the ordinance whether or not it applied to 
guide dogs. 
The ordinance has been enacted by a two-to-one vote.  However, the 
only two possible intended meanings have each been rejected by two to 
one.  What is the ordinance’s meaning?  There is no reason to privilege 
A’s intended meaning merely because he proposed the ordinance; things 
would be no different if some citizen or group had submitted it without 
clarifying its application to guide dogs.  And what is true of A’s intended 
meaning is true of B’s.  There are no other intended meanings available, 
as including or excluding guide dogs exhausts the logical possibilities. 
Perhaps BLMR have a solution at hand for this problem.  Or, more 
likely, perhaps they believe that such situations could not occur in Congress, 
given the processes that bills go through before passage.  Members of 
Congress, unlike my hypothetical city council members, will know 
what page each member is on and will make sure that everyone is on 
the same page with respect to his or her intended meaning.  But notice 
that this does not involve credibility, but rather transparency.  I leave it 
to others to assess the plausibility of such transparency with respect to 
intended meanings. 
One other point that BLMR might make is that it is possible for 
members of Congress (M) to delegate to key players (KP) the authority 
to have KP’s intended meaning constitute the intended meaning of M.  
Again, doing so would not make KP credible, but rather would make KP 
authoritative. 




All this might work to avert the conceptual problem of multiplicity 
within a house of Congress.  But would it do so between houses of 
Congress?  Suppose, for example, that the Democrats control the House 
of Representatives and the Republicans control the Senate.  Suppose the 
House passes a bill that encodes the House’s intended meaning A.  
Suppose the Senate wishes to use the same text—the same signals—to 
encode a different intended meaning, B.  Which meaning—A or B—does 
the bill encode?  And suppose the President announces—in good faith—
that he is signing the bill only because he is intending meaning C (or A 
or B) through the bill’s text.  Does the President’s meaning count? 
I find nothing in BLMR’s discussion that deals with the possibility 
that one house of Congress or the President, especially when a different 
political party is in control, may infuse the other house’s text with a 
different intended meaning from the original one, without changing that 
text and thus avoiding a reconciliation conference.  But recent presidential 
signing statements should alert them to this problem, which, as I have 
indicated, is broader than presidential last actor opportunism. 
In conclusion, BLMR’s approach to statutory interpretation is one that 
I endorse.  They have pointed out the way toward solving many of the 
evidentiary problems connected with intended statutory meanings in 
multimember legislatures.  The conceptual problems regarding such intended 
meanings remain on the agenda, however. 
Again, in claiming that BLMR have not solved those conceptual 
problems, I am not making any criticism from which I, also an endorser 
of the intended meaning approach to legal interpretation, am exempt.  
Their conceptual problem is mine as well.  Nor do so-called objective 
intent approaches to statutory (and constitutional) interpretation represent 
coherent solutions to the multiplicity of authors conceptual problem.  
For example, the “original public meaning” approach is not a solution 
because it is parasitic upon the intended meaning approach rather than an 
alternative to it.10  That is, the meaning that a contemporaneous hypothetical 
member of the public would ascribe to a statute would depend upon what 
that hypothetical person believed the legislature’s intended meaning to be, 
which would in turn depend upon what that person believed were the 
intended meanings of the various legislators voting “aye,” which leads 
right back to the conceptual problem.  Moreover, because a hypothetical 
member of the public would have to be given some base of information 
about the statute in addition to its text, constructing that base of 
information so that it is different from the information now before the 
present interpreter will be necessary if the hypothetical member of the 
 10. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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public is to be different from the real interpreter.  But I see no way of 
constructing that base of information that will not be arbitrary—especially 
because any member of the public will be trying to figure out, using any 
and all relevant evidence at his disposal, what the legislature’s intended 
meaning is, just as the legislature will be trying to achieve an uptake in 
the public that matches its intended meaning. 
I see no method of interpretation available to BLMR or to me that 
(1) accepts that the purpose of interpretation is to recover—decode—the 
intended meaning that has been “compressed” into the legislature’s text 
(its “signal”), and (2) avoids the conceptual problems attendant on the 
multiplicity of legislators.  BLMR’s contribution is to provide a template 
for assessing the credibility of the legislative history by investigating 
“how bills become laws” in a Congress in which political parties are 
major players.  But credibility of evidence is different from relevance 
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